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Abstract 
The paper examines the interaction between a bank and a development financial institution (DFIs) in 
a macroeconomic set-up, both of whom can lend for working capital and investment finance 
purposes. Our analysis reveals that the reduction in the interest rate premium on bonds over the 
deposit rate is an important pre-requisite for the DFI to raise its market share in both investment 
finance and working capital lending. Also, greater corporate access to bond financing raises 
investment, output and the bond rate of interest. The policy implications of the analysis are 
examined. 
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Introduction 
Restructuring of financial intermediaries and development of financial markets are two 
important elements in the process of financial sector reforms. India, in its era of economic reforms 
during the 1990s has been no different. Nationalised banks, which had been the most important 
financial intermediaries are increasingly facing competition from securities markets and other 
financial intermediaries like non-banking financial companies and mutual funds. The nature of this 
competition and its impact on the economy could be fruitfully addressed only in reference to the 
specific institutional arrangements prevailing in India. In this article, we examine the interaction 
between banks and the development financial institutions (DFIs) and their macroeconomic 
consequences.  
Post-nationalisation, commercial banks expanded their branch network very rapidly and 
provided the bedrock of financial resource mobilisation and credit deployment for the economy as a 
whole. The number of bank offices in India expanded nearly eight-fold from 8,262 in June 1969 to 
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64,939 in March 1999. Deposits as percentage of National Income expanded from 15.5 per cent in 
June 1969 to 48.1 in March 1991 and thereafter to 48.7 per cent in March 1999. The deposit base, 
accounting for nearly 48 per cent of financial savings of the household during 1998-99, has been 
instrumental in providing finance to both the corporate sector and the Government to meet its 
expenditure. Since securities markets were relatively underdeveloped and unable to meet the 
increasing resource requirement of the process of industrialization, the deposit base of commercial 
banks were also used to finance publicly owned DFIs for their investment financing. 
In India and elsewhere, development financial institutions (DFIs) were established to resolve 
a typical market inadequacy: the shortage of long-term investments and the perceived socially 
unjustifiable risk aversion of savers and creditors. In view of the inadequate provision of long-term 
credit through banks or markets, many of these institutions were sponsored by national 
governments. The emergence of DFIs was expected to resolve the long-term credit shortages as well 
as acquire and disseminate skills necessary to assess investment projects and borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. Although the oldest such government sponsored institution began in the 
Netherlands with the establishment of the Societe Generale pour favoriser I’Industrie National in 1822, it 
was well over twenty years later that development banking came into its own with the establishment 
of the Credit Mobiliser in France in 1848 for financing of Continental European railway expansion 
(Aghion, 1998). Even in the 20th century, the need for rapid post-war reconstruction of Continental 
Europe led to the emergence of many new development financial institutions. In Asia too, such 
institutions served as models; an important example in this context being the Industrial Bank of Japan 
(IBJ) founded in 1900. The IBJ assisted not only in the development of the domestic capital markets, 
but it also performed the role of obtaining portfolio capital for the industrial firms in Japan1.  
The endorsement of planned industrialization at the national level provided critical 
inducements for establishment of DFIs in India. The first development financial institution, the 
Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) was established in 1948. Thereafter, a series of such 
institutions, both at the state-level as well as at the all-India level, including among others, the 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (1955) and Industrial Development Bank of India (1964) 
were established. Subsequently, specialized development banks to take care of rural financing 
requirements, export finance, housing finance and small scale sector have also been established. As it 
stands at present, apart from banks, mutual funds, insurance and non-banking financial institutions, a 
wide array of development banks catering to the needs of various segments of industry and 
agriculture constitute a vital element of the financial system in India (Bhatt, 1993). 
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DFIs in India have for long been dependent on the soft window of Long-Term Operations 
(LTO) funds from the Reserve Bank at concessional rates for meeting their long-term financing 
requirements. Besides, they had access to cheap funds from bilateral/multilateral agencies, which 
were guaranteed by the government and carried low coupon rates. Moreover, the institutions were 
allowed to issue bonds with sovereign guarantee, which qualified as investments by banks for 
maintaining statutory liquidity ratio (SLR). On the asset side of the balance sheet, DFIs have 
traditionally been engaged in investment financing, with banks mainly catering to working capital 
finance. Since 1992, however, there has been a gradual movement towards convergence of activities 
of banks and DFIs. Partly because of the problems of the Budget and partly on account of financial 
reforms, the traditional sources of long-term funds have dried up. Also, the reluctance of foreign 
agencies and international financial institutions to provide long-term loans (under IDA, for example) 
has meant that DFIs will have to compete with banks for resources. DFIs had to therefore raise 
medium-term/long-term resources, as well as issue long-term bonds at market rates of interest2. 
Banks too, under the new prudential regulations have begun to access the debt and stock markets to 
shore up their capital levels. Again, banks have been making a foray into investment financing while 
financial institutions have been entering the domain of short-term financing, with the result that the 
competition for supply of funds has also intensified. As a consequence of the erosion of the hitherto 
conventional divide between banks and financial institutions, the raison de tour of DFIs has 
increasingly been called into question. Elsewhere in the world, the demise of the Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933 in the US, which hitherto segregated commercial and investment banking and with 
amendments in the Securities and Exchange Act in Japan that prevented banking and insurance 
activities under one umbrella, the tremors of universal banking are being increasingly felt in India in 
recent years3. 
While various aspects of this transformation and the future policy options have been 
extensively discussed with reference to the financial viability of banks and DFIs, there has been 
limited discussion about their macroeconomic impact. Limited studies on the analysis of 
development banks elsewhere have focused on the Development Bank of the Philippines, 
development banking in Tanzania and nearer home, the Asian Development Bank (ADB). These 
papers are essentially descriptive in nature and analyze questions like the financial viability of 
development banks (Manzano, 1990), need for more refined methods of managing long-term lending 
(Rwegasira, 1992) and the performance of the ADB (Sender, 1993). The article which comes closest 
to the spirit of this paper is the one by Holmstrom and Tirole (1994). In particular, the focus of the 
paper is the effects that reductions in different types of capital have on aggregate and sectoral 
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investments, interest rates and the relative roles of direct (market) and indirect (intermediated) 
finance. However, in their analysis, the borrowing capacity of both firms and intermediaries is 
limited, so that a redistribution of wealth across firms and intermediaries impacts investment and 
interest rates. The present paper, in contrast, develops a micro-theoretic model of interaction 
between a bank and a financial institution in the credit market within a standard framework of 
industrial organization with no constraint on borrowing capacity of intermediaries from external 
sources. The model is linked to a simplified macroeconomic structure to examine the implications of 
policy changes on both the real and financial sector variables. Although our model is couched in a 
static setup, it is able to highlight certain long-term trends with respect to behaviour of banks and 
DFIs in the credit market. It is however possible to construct a much richer model that allows for 
interaction among an array of banks and DFIs in a multi-period setting; but this is not considered for 
the present purpose essentially to keep the model simple and meaningful. The basic framework of 
the model is developed in Section II. Section III examines the process of interest rate determination 
whereas section IV traces the impact of changes in policies and of market structure. The main 
contribution and the area of future research direction are addressed in Section V.  
Our analysis reveals that the reduction in the interest rate premium on bonds over the 
deposit rate is an important pre-requisite for the market share of the DFI to increase both in 
investment and working capital lending. From a macroeconomic perspective, however, it has little 
effect on output. The analysis also reveals that greater corporate access to bond financing raises 
investment, output and the bond rate of interest. Finally, a declining interest rate policy helps to 
improve the market share of the DFI in the working capital segment, whereas its effect on the 
market share in the investment finance segment is ambiguous.    
 
II. The Model 
 
We assume a closed economy, single-period set-up where there are two financial 
intermediaries: a bank and a development financial institution (DFI). Both of them can serve the 
credit market in which two segments are distinguished - one for working capital finance and the 
other for investment finance. While investment financing and working capital lending generally differ 
in terms of their maturity pattern, this is of no consequence in the present model and the maturities 
of loans in both cases are assumed to be identical. The distinction between these two types of credit, 
in the present context, is based on two premises.  
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The first one is based on the asymmetry of transactions costs of financial intermediation 
between investment financing and working capital financing. Before undertaking investment finance, 
the lender has to incur a cost for evaluating the viability of the project. With the advent of 
liberalization, the principles of planned economic development have progressively been discarded in 
the favour of a competition-based entrepreneurship, so that evaluation of long-term viability of new 
projects has emerged as a specialised activity. On this count, the cost of project evaluation for 
investment purposes is relatively higher vis-à-vis cost of evaluating projects for working capital 
finance. In other words, while working capital lending does not involve any (or insignificant) 
transactions costs, investment financing involves a positive transactions cost. 
In the Indian context, major DFIs have historically been associated with investment 
financing requirements and have, therefore, over time, built up specialized skills in project appraisal4. 
Banks' foray in the investment financing is, however, a recent phenomenon in India. This leads to 
our first assumption: 
 
Assumption 1: The bank incurs a transactions cost of c per unit of lending in order to undertake investment financing, 
which the DFI does not. Working capital financing does not involve any transaction cost. 
 
The second distinction is based on the interdependence between the demand for investment 
credit and that for working capital. Such interdependence arises if we consider an economy where 
output to be demand-driven. Since demand for working capital depends on demand for output, 
investment finance drives the working capital requirement. Finally, we assume that the bank and the 
DFI have effective means of monitoring the end-use of funds, so that producers do not take 
advantage of the possible interest rate differential between the two segments of the credit market.  
The relationship between output (Y) and demand for working capital (Wd) is summarised in 
assumption 2. 
 
Assumption 2: Each unit of output requires a fixed amount, a, of working capital, i.e., Wd=aY. 5 
 
It is assumed that internal source of funding by corporates' is of minor importance (and set 
at zero) and therefore, the entire funding is from external sources. For simplicity, three possible 
external sources of funds for the corporates are considered: credit from bank, credit from DFI and 
financing through direct issuance of bonds. 
The relative advantage of the bank in the process of financial intermediation emanates from 
its ability to access deposits at a relatively low cost vis-a-vis the cost of funds for the DFI. The volume 
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of this deposit base is exogenous, given the stock of money (fixed by the Central Bank), currency 
deposit ratio and the cash reserve ratio (CRR). While the DFI finances its on-lending by issuing 
bonds at the prevailing interest rate r, the bank finances its lending primarily through its deposit base. 
There is, however, no restriction on the bank to either invest in or borrow from the bond market at 
the prevailing rate, r. Therefore, the prevailing bond rate, r becomes a floor to the lending rates - 
both for working capital and investment finance.  
 
Assumption 3: The bank has an assured deposit base. While the DFI finances its entire on-lending by issuing bonds 
at the bond rate r, the interest rate on bank deposit equals (r-θ), where θ (>0) represents the premium of bond rate 
over the deposit rate. 
 
Further, we assume that, 
Assumption 4: The bank’s deposit base is sufficient to serve the entire demand for working capital. 
 
The bond market as considered here is far from perfect. In particular, the bond market is 
assumed to discriminate between issuers in a stark way. It permits financial intermediaries (i.e., the 
bank and the DFI) to raise unlimited amount at the prevailing rate of interest, whereas individual 
corporate houses are rationed in terms of quantity they can raise at the prevailing rate. This rule of 
thumb is hardly surprising in view of the limited infrastructure in the bond market to efficiently 
process detailed information about corporates. Since the ability of the bond market to assess the 
long-term viability of projects is limited, the ability of the issuer to access finance from institutional 
sources (i.e., through credit) provides crucial information to the bond market about corporate 
credibility. In other words, in a world of informational asymmetry, institutional finance acts as a 
screening device: it separates the better corporates from the not-so-better ones. Therefore, the 
quantum of funds raised by corporates directly from the bond market depends, to a large extent, on 
the quantum of credit obtained from institutional sources. Since, more often than not, bonds are 
issued with the primary aim of financing investments, the relation between quantum raised through 
bonds and investment demand is summarised by assumption 5 6.  
 
Assumption 5: Corporates resource mobilisation from the bond market is proportional to investment credit raised from 
institutional sources. The amount raised thus is used for financing investment. 
 
Producers, as a rule of thumb, apply a constant mark-up, α over the cost of working capital, 
including interest cost. Fixed requirement of working capital for every unit of output renders the 
demand for working capital insensitive to interest rate charged on working capital (rw) up to a limit. 
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This limit, beyond which there would be no demand for working capital, is naturally given by the 
condition that entire excess profit of the producer, over and above his fixed mark-up, α, is eaten up 
by interest cost on working capital. Normalising the price of output to unity, this condition is given 
by the relation 
0)1()1(1 =++− αwra  
so that, 
]1)}1([{ 1* −+= −αarw                                                                                                                    (1) 
It may be checked that, rw* is the ceiling for not only rw but for rT as well. Should rT> rw*, then neither 
the bank nor the DFI would lend for working capital purposes and output drops to zero. Only when 
rT≤ rw* will the positive working capital lending be ensured. Assuming that demand for investment 
credit is inversely related to interest rate charged, every increase in term lending reduces rT. On the 
other hand, financial intermediaries can always increase working capital at rw* until the entire demand 
for the same is satisfied. To summarize, the following relationship between the three sets of interest 
rates would always be satisfied. 
*
wT rrr ≤<                                                                                                                                      (2) 
This inequality, combined with the assumption that financial intermediaries can always borrow at the 
prevailing rate from the bond market, ensures that the demand for working capital would always be 
fully met by the financial intermediaries.  
Output, Y in standard text-book fashion, is given by the relation 
sGIY /)( +=                                                                                                                                (3) 
where s is the marginal propensity to save, G is government expenditure, financed entirely through 
issue of government bonds7 and I is investment demand, financed entirely through term lending.  
Combining our earlier assumption that corporates directly issue bonds to part-finance investment 
demand and that the amount of bond issue by corporates is proportional to total investment credit 
received from the bank and DFI, we can write total investment credit as 
I=(1+γ)IC,                                                                                                                                       (4) 
where IC is the total investment credit received from the bank and the DFI and γ is the constant 
proportion between direct bond issue by corporates and IC. 
The demand for investment finance is inversely related to the interest rate according as: 
ToC rII −=                                                                                                                                    (5) 
where Io is the exogenous investment demand and rT is the interest rate.  
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Both the bank and financial institution are permitted to lend in the two credit markets. In the 
working capital market, both intermediaries charge rw* while sharing the market between them.  
Total attainable surplus from working capital lending is given by the relation: 
Wrrww )(
* −=Π                                                                                                                           (6) 
We employ a symmetric Nash-bargaining solution to determine the market share of the bank, λ and 
of the DFI, (1-λ) over the total surplus, ΠW. As Binmore et.al. (1986) have demonstrated, the Nash 
bargaining solution can be proxied to be the limiting case of an extensive form ‘offer-counter-offer’ 
bargaining game.  
 
An important feature of the Nash bargaining programme is the specification of the threat 
points: what the parties would obtain in the event of a disagreement in bargaining. In the light of 
assumption 4, it is possible for the bank, in case of disagreement, to drive out the DFI by charging 
the bond rate of interest, r, on working capital lending. In such situation, the bank can still enjoy a 
surplus of θW, while the DFI gets zero. Therefore, the Nash bargaining solution dictates that λ is 
determined from the following problem: 
)]()1[(])([ ** rrrrMax ww −−−− λθλλ  
Carrying out the necessary maximization exercise, we obtain λ to be 
2/)}]/({1[ ** rrw −+= ϑλ                                                                                                              (7) 
Not surprisingly, a decline in the cost of bank deposit (i.e., an increase in θ) improves the 
bank’s market share in working capital. Similarly, an increase in the interest spread [i.e., an increase in 
(rw*- r)] would improve DFI’s profit share. This is because consequent upon an increase in the 
spread, a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy would be less gainful for the bank, so that accommodating 
the DFI would be preferred. 
Having obtained the respective shares of the bank and the DFI in working capital, the 
optimum term-lending by FI and the bank can be determined. Towards this end, we employ a 
Cournot-Nash solution in which each player determines his lending decision, taking that of the other 
player as independent of his own.  
In other words, the maximisation problems of the bank and the DFI can be written as 
)()( * rrWcrrIMax wTCBICB
−+−− λ                                                                                              (8) 
and  
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)()1()( * rrWrrIMax wTCFICB
−−+− λ                                                                                           (9) 
with (I=ICB+ ICF), where ICB and ICF denote investment lending by the bank and the DFI, 
respectively and c denotes the transaction cost of the bank per unit of investment lending. 
Carrying out the necessary substitutions and maximising expressions (8) and (9) with respect to the 
given arguments yields the expressions 
3/)]3)(2/()[()( * θ−−++−= rrsacrIrI woCF                                                                       (10) 
and 
3/)]3)(2/()2[()( * θ+−+−−= rrsacrIrI woCB                                                                     (11) 
Therefore, the total quantum of credit for investment purpose, IC is given by  
3/)])(/()(2[)( * rrsacrIrI woC −+−−=                                                                               (12) 
Consequently, the rate of interest on investment credit rT is given by 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++−+= )2(
3
1 *
0 s
arr
s
acIr wT                                                                                             (13) 
The total demand for working capital loans, using (3), (5) and (12) is given by 
srrsacrIGarW wo /)]()/()(2))(3/)1(([)(
* −+−−++= γ                                                   (14) 
Finally, the total supply of credit in the system, L is given by the expression 
]3/)}()/()(2))[/)1(1({)/[()()()( * rrsacrIsasGarWrIrL woC −+−−+++=+= γ     (15) 
An inspection of equation of (10) through (15) reveals some interesting aspects of credit market 
intermediation by the bank and DFI. The disadvantage of banks in project evaluation vis-à-vis the 
DFI, as reflected in the transactions cost, c, imposes a burden not only on the total quantum of term 
lending advanced by the financial system, but also on the overall quantum of the working capital and 
total credit. In particular, while a reduction in the transaction cost would result in a decline in the 
investment credit by the financial institution, the corresponding increase in investment credit by the 
bank would more than offset it. 
How are the market shares of the bank (and the DFI) in working capital and investment finance 
affected by the development of the bond market? While the process of bond market development 
has many aspects, one indicator of importance is the interest rate premium on bonds vis-à-vis the 
bank deposit rate, θ. Development of the secondary bond market would reduce this premium over 
time. It is important to note that the parameter θ, does not have any effect either on the aggregate 
amount of term lending or on working capital lending. A change in θ only reallocates the market 
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share in term-lending and working capital lending between the two intermediaries. A decline in θ, for 
instance, reflecting the development of the bond market, would reduce the investment credit by the 
bank in the favour of the DFI. It would, using (7), increase the market share of DFI in the market 
for working capital lending. This lends credence to the oft-quoted belief that the development of the 
bond market, therefore, is an important pre-requisite for the financial institution to improve their 
market share. 
 
Proposition 1: A reduction in the interest rate premium on bonds over the bank deposit would not change aggregate 
investment credit or working capital credit. A decline in the premium would, however, improve the market share of the 
DFI in both the working capital and investment finance segments at the expense of the bank 
 
Another question of interest is how is the market share of the bank (resp., the DFI) in the 
working capital market altered, consequent upon a change in the bond rate of interest? Simple 
calculations reveal that  
0)(2/ 2* >−=∂
∂ rr
r w
θλ                                                                                                               (16) 
In other words, a rise in the bond rate of interest improves the market share of banks in the 
working capital market. As every rise in the bond rate of interest reduces the profit per unit of 
working capital lending, the co-operative outcome involving sharing the market with the financial 
institution by charging a uniform rate of interest, rW* becomes relatively less attractive to the bank vis-
a-vis its outside opportunity ‘going it alone’: serving the entire market by itself at a rate of interest r, 
and thereby, making a profit of θ per unit of lending, while driving the DFI out of the market. 
Therefore, a co-operative outcome following an increase in r would necessarily improve bank's share, 
λ in the working capital market. 
In respect of the market share in the investment credit, we find that,  
]
)]3)(6/()[(
))}(2/)2(3{[)/( 2* θ
θ
−−++−
−+−=∂
∂
rrsacrI
acsssa
r
II
wo
CFCB                                                             (17) 
Since the denominator is always positive, the sign of the derivative would depend on the sign of the 
numerator. An increase in interest rate on bonds would improve the share of the bank in the term 
lending market provided its transaction cost in project-appraisal is below a critical threshold as given 
by aθ/s. Put alternately, when c<aθ/s, a policy of low interest rate (say, by expansion of money 
supply) would improve the share of the financial institution in the market for investment credit. If, 
however, in the initial phase of the bank's foray in the investment financing, it faces a high 
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transactions cost, then a low interest rate enables it to improve its market share as compared with the 
DFI.   
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the bond rate would raise, keep unaltered or reduce the relative share of the bank vis-à-
vis the DFI in the market for investment credit according as c<=>aθ/s.  
 
III. Determination of Interest Rate on Bonds 
All variables in the credit market, as can be seen from equation (10) through (15) are 
functions of the bond rate of interest. We have also noticed in the inequality (2) that the interest rate 
structure is significantly influenced by the interest rate on working capital rW. As both intermediaries 
would set rw=rw*={a(1+α)}-1-1 and share the surplus, it is essentially product market parameters that 
set the upper limit on the interest rates in the economy. An increase in producers' mark up (α) or an 
increase in working capital requirement per Rupee of output would bring down the ceiling of bond 
rate of interest. While the ceiling of bond interest rate is given by the product market conditions, its 
level is determined in the bond market. In this section, we examine the bond market and the process 
of interest rate determination.  
It is assumed that bonds, loans and deposits are of equal maturity. This renders the 
distinction between stocks and flows irrelevant for the present purpose. Further, we make the 
following simplifying assumption: 
 
Assumption 5: The bonds issued by various entities (viz., government, DFI, banks and corporate sector) are 
homogenous in all respects. 
 
Assume that households have a well-defined bond demand function of the form: 
0,; >+= vlYvrlBD                                                                                                           (18) 
where l and v are the sensitivity of bond demand with respect to interest and income, respectively. 
Since bonds are unlikely to be used for the purpose of financing consumption, its additional demand 
would form only a part of new savings. Accordingly, v <s.  
The supply of bonds, BS, on the other hand, is the total of supply by four issuers, viz., 
government, DFI, bank and corporates. In other words, 
d
eMrIrWG
rI
d
eMrIrWrIrWGB
C
CCBCFS
+
−−+++=
++
−−+++−+=
1
)1()()1()(
)(]
1
)1()()([)]())()1[(
γ
γλλ
                       (19) 
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where M is the stock of money fixed by the central bank, e is the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and d is the 
currency-deposit ratio. Equating demand and supply of bonds yields the following condition: 
*
2
2
22
3
)()1(
3
))(1(2
1
)1(
3
)()1(])([]
3
)23)(1([
wo rs
saaI
s
sa
d
eM
s
sac
s
saG
s
ssaalrYv
++++++
+
−−++−+=+++++
γγ
γγ
                (20) 
This relation is labelled as the bond market equilibrium. It describes the locus of (Y,r) 
combinations that maintain equilibrium in the bond market. As evident from (20), ∂r/∂Y<0. 
Intuitively, a rise in income implies higher demand for bonds, implying a rise in the price of bonds 
and a consequent fall in interest rates. This is plotted as the BM locus in Figure 1. Any (Y, r) 
combination to the right of BM would imply a situation of excess demand in the bond market and r 
would tend to fall. Similarly, a situation of excess supply prevails in the bond market to the left of 
BM.  
In a similar fashion, using equations (5) and (14) and making the relevant substitutions, we 
obtain, 
ssracIGrsasY wo /]3/))}/(2)(1{([}3/)]2)(1{[(
*2 +−++=+++ γγ                             (21) 
We term this equation as the product market equilibrium: it traces the locus of (Y,r) 
combinations that maintain equilibrium in the product market. From the above equation it is clear 
that ∂r/∂Y<0. Intuitively, a decline in the bond rate of interest, through its effect on the interest rate 
on investment credit, stimulates investment. This, via the demand multiplier, ensures a higher level of 
income. In Figure 1, this is represented as the PM locus. Any (Y, r) combination to the right of PM 
would involve a situation where the supply of working capital would not be adequate to generate 
output, Y. Accordingly, Y would tend to decline. Reverse would be the case to the left of the PM 
locus. Combining the above information, it is clear that both the BM and the PM loci are negatively 
sloped in the (Y,r) plane. 
 
IV. Implications of Policy Changes 
Totally differentiating equations (20) and (21) and rearranging, we obtain, 
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where J= [l+{(1+γ)(a2+3as+2s2)}/3s2] 
         X={[(a+s)/3s][ 2I0-c+(a/s) rW*]-[(1/3s2)(a2+3as+2s2)r]} 
and   Z={[(1/3s)( 2I0-c+(a/s) rW*)]-[(1/3s2)(a+2s)r]}. 
 
The determinant of the above matrix is given by the expression7 
0)(
3
)1)(2(]
3
)1)(2([ 22 <−−−++=−++= lsavs
saJ
s
savD γγ  
We are now in a position to conduct certain comparative static exercises. 
First, we examine the effect of fiscal policy. Clearly, 
0]
3
)2)(([1 3 >−++=∂
∂
s
J
s
sasa
DG
Y
                                                                                         (23) 
and, 
0])([1 >+−=∂
∂
s
sa
s
v
DG
r
                                                                                                        (24) 
Clearly, a rise in government expenditure raises output but also raises the interest rate on bonds. 
From the bond market condition, a rise in government expenses (through increased supply of bonds) 
leads to a rise in interest rates for a given income level. However, in the product market a rise in 
government expenditure leads to an expansion of income, which in turn increases the demand for 
bond and puts a downward pressure on the bond rate of interest. As the marginal propensity to 
invest in bonds out of additional income (v) is relatively small, this would mean (v-a-s)<0, so that, 
increased government expenditure would raise interest rate in the bond market. In the new 
equilibrium, therefore, increased output comes at the cost of private investment, which would be 
lower on account of higher rate of interest charged on investment credit following the hike in the 
bond rate (equation 13).  
 
Proposition 3: An increase in government expenses unambiguously raises output and bond rate of interest, but reduces 
private investment 
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On the monetary policy front, it is clear that  
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Not surprisingly, the effects of monetary policy on output and interest rates are found to be usual in 
direction. In particular, an increase in money supply raises output and depresses interest rate. 
Economically speaking, a rise in money supply would imply that agents are more willing to hold 
bonds, so that bond prices rise and bond rates fall. A fall in interest rates would imply greater credit 
for investment financing, and via the multiplier effect, greater output. 
 
Proposition 4: An expansionary monetary policy raises output and lowers interest rates.  
 
Of greater interest from the point of view of the present exercise is the effect of changes in 
direct access of corporates to the bond market, as reflected in a change in the parameter γ. An 
increase in γ would mean greater direct access by corporates to the bond market. Such a possibility 
might arise from several policy developments, e.g., liberalization of norms for bond issuance by 
corporates, strengthening the credit rating systems, to mention a few. 
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Increased corporate access to the bond market has important macroeconomic consequences. 
Increased corporate access to the bond market reduces their dependence on the institutional 
intermediaries for undertaking investment. Increased issuance of bonds by corporates, however, 
raises bond rate of interest, as the offsetting effect through increased bond demand resulting from 
higher income would be relatively low. Higher bond interest by increasing rT would obviously reduce 
the investment credit from the bank and the DFI, but the effect would be of second order so that 
total investment and output would rise. The bank and the DFI, however gain from increased demand 
for working capital.  
 
Proposition 5: An increase in corporate access to bond market raises output and the bond rate of interest. It reduces the 
investment financed through credit by the bank and the DFI, although total investment increases. 
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Finally, we also examine the effect of a change in the producers' mark-up. Due to equation 
(1) this would change the ceiling rate of interest, rw*. For example, a reduction in producers' mark-up 
would increase rw*. Using (22) we find that 
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Interestingly, a reduction in producers' mark-up by increasing the ceiling rate of interest also 
increases the bond rate of interest and output. To understand the underlying dynamics, which 
originate in the product market, let us note that due to equation (13), 
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Using equation (30) and after simplification we find that 
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We may note that an increase in rW* renders provision of working capital lending more profitable for 
the financial intermediaries. The demand for working capital depends on the demand for output, 
which, in turn, depends on investment demand. An increase in rw*, as may be seen from equation 
(31), has two opposing effects on the rate of interest on investment credit and thereby on the volume 
of investment credit. Firstly, in order to expand working capital lending, intermediaries charge a 
lower rate of interest on investment credit to boost its demand. This, through the multiplier effect, 
generates greater demand for working capital. Greater credit off-take, however, also increases the net 
supply of bonds and increases bond rate of interest (the possible counter-effect through income 
channel being insufficient). The second term in the right hand side of (31) reflects the upward 
pressure on rT due to increase in the bond rate. This second effect of increase in rW* on rT, however, 
is found to be insufficient so that rT falls in the equilibrium as a result of an increase in rw*. 
Accordingly, investment credit and total output also rise. 
 
Proposition 6: A reduction in producers’ mark-up would expand investment, total credit and output despite an increase 
in the bond rate of interest. 
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V. Concluding Observations 
Banks and DFIs, two of the important financial intermediaries in India, are increasingly 
competing each other with regard to both mobilisation as well as deployment of funds. The 
development of the bond market is shaping the nature of this competition in several crucial ways. In 
this article, we have made an attempt to identify some of the elements of the intermediation process 
which are expected to play important role on the outcome. Within an industrial organisation 
framework, we examined the behaviour of these two types of intermediaries in the two segments of 
the credit market viz., working capital and investment finance.  
Whereas the relative advantage of banks lies in their ability to mobilise low-cost deposits, the 
DFIs are advantageously placed in extending investment credit at minimal transactions cost (assumed 
to be zero in the present setup) vis-à-vis banks. Their relative advantages, however, impact their 
market share and macro-economic variables differently. While development of the bond market (in 
terms of reduction in interest rate premium on bonds over deposits) improves the market shares of 
the DFI, it has no effect whatsoever on the quantum of credit, investment, output or the interest rate 
of the economy. Thus banks end up as ‘second-best’ in such a situation. On the other hand, a gradual 
decline in the transaction cost of extending investment credit by banks not only improves their 
market share in investment financing, but it also raises the quantum of credit extended to the system 
along with the level of output. Banks tend to be better placed in such situations. 
Secondly, as the interest rate in the bond market declines, the market share of banks in the 
working capital market vis-à-vis DFIs falls as well. However, the effect of an increase in the bond rate 
of interest on banks' share in the investment credit is less than certain and depends on the costs of 
transactions as compared with the relative cheapness of deposits. It is found that when banks' 
transactions cost for extending investment credit is relatively high, then a policy of low interest rate 
helps banks to improve their market share. A high interest regime, on the other hand improves 
banks' share in the investment finance as against DFIs, if its transaction cost is relatively low. 
Thirdly, increased corporate access to the bond market significantly impacts the 
macroeconomic aggregates. Increased direct recourse to bond market reduces corporates' reliance on 
institutional credit, so that the investment credit from institutional sources decline. However, total 
credit, output and the rate of interest on bonds increase due to expansion in working capital. 
Accordingly, from a macroeconomic perspective, policy initiatives to enhance information-
processing capacity of bond markets through strengthening credit rating structure and through better 
disclosure/accounting standards would be conducive to the development of the real sector.  A 
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somewhat similar expansionary effect occurs along with an increase in the bond rate of interest when 
producers reduce their mark-up.  
In the present framework, product market influences the interest rate structure of the 
economy by imposing a ceiling. This is an immediate outcome of the fixed mark-up rule adopted by 
the producers. While a more realistic model would have to endogenise this mark-up by allowing for 
working capital financing through internal and other market sources, the present assumption conveys 
a simple, yet important message: any policy that makes working capital dearer would have drastic 
impact on the demand for working capital and the level of output as well.   
The restructuring of the financial sector is often aimed at encouraging competition among 
financial intermediaries. The present article has demonstrated that the outcome of this competition 
crucially depends on the development of other financial markets (‘the financial infrastructure’) and 
the policy stance of the monetary authority.  
The present analysis imposed several restrictions on the pattern of corporate financing. A 
richer model must allow for the possibility of financing from internal sources and from equity 
markets as well. At another level, there is also a need to examine the dynamic aspects of the 
competition between banks and DFIs in a multi-period set-up. One can also examine the effect of 
competition by allowing more than one bank and DFI. These should form part of the future research 
agenda. 
 
Endnotes 
* Corresponding Author: Saibal Ghosh: sai_ghosh@hotmail.com The author is Research Officers in the 
Department of Economic Analysis and Policy (DEAP) of the Reserve Bank of India, Fort, Mumbai 400 001. 
This forms collaborative work with friend and colleague, Dr. Anamitra Saha, who suffered an untimely demise 
in 2000. The opinion expressed in the article rests entirely with the authors' and do not, in any way, reflect 
those of the institution to which they belong. The authors would like to thank, without implicating, Bhaskar 
Chattopadhyay and Indranil Bhattacharyya for helpful suggestions. 
 
1. A detailed discussion of development banks is provided in Diamond (1957). 
 
2. In India, DFIs are generally debarred from accepting chequeable deposits. 
 
3. The Reserve Bank of India appointed a Working Group to examine the possibilities for Harmonization of 
the Role and Operations of DFIs and Banks. The Working Group, in its Report suggested, among others, 
a gradual move towards universal banking practices. In the light of the above, the Reserve Bank prepared a 
'Discussion Paper' for wider public debate on the issue of universalisation of banking and eliminating the 
function-specific role of DFIs. It suggested that, while universal banking is a desirable goal, in the present 
scenario, DFIs remain an important conduit for bridging the demand-supply mismatch for long-term 
funds, owing to the inadequate development of debt markets. On the basis of feedback received on the 
Discussion Paper, in the Monetary and Credit Policy of April 2000, the Reserve Bank delineated a broad 
approach focusing on the status of financial sector reforms, the state of preparedness of the concerned 
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institutions, the evolution of regulatory-regime and above all, a viable transition path, for institutions 
desirous of moving in the direction of universal banking. 
 
4. In the present setup, banks have to incur a transactions cost for investment finance, whereas DFIs do not 
have to incur any cost for advancing working capital finance. This can be justified on the ground that 
DFIs, more often than not, provide working capital loans to corporates to whom they have already 
advanced investment finance. As a consequence, their cost of appraisal for working capital loans is 
relatively lower (assumed to be zero, in this case). 
 
5. As we shall subsequently see, within the present framework, the demand for working capital would be fully 
met, so that, Wd=W. 
 
6. In India, corporates have to meet a number of criteria to directly raise resource from the bond market. 
Besides their track record, these companies have also to disclose in their prospectus, the purpose, the lead 
manager, the quantum of resource to be raised, the pattern of shareholding, the credit rating status, etc. The 
end-use of the resources so raised as also the repayment performances are monitored by an independent 
body of trustees. 
 
7. Government bonds are assumed to be retired by monetisation by the Central Bank. 
 
8. The negativity of the determinant, which is a necessary condition for stability, is provided in Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 1 
 
It is demonstrated that a stable equilibrium requires the product market schedule, PM to be 
steeper than the bond market schedule, BM. Suppose a stable equilibrium is represented by 
(Y*, r*). Then a marginal disturbance in r* would be self-restoring. Suppose there is a small 
decline in r from r*.  In the bond market this would lead to an increase in the supply of 
bonds (to finance a increased supply of credit) as well as a reduction in bond demand at the 
prevailing Y*. The combined effect would be an excess supply of bonds to the tune of J 
leading to an increase in r at the prevailing Y*. This could be seen from equation (18). 
But Y would also deviate from Y*, as there would be greater demand for investment 
demand leading to greater supply of working capital. The initial decline in the rate of interest 
would lead to an increase in investment demand to the tune of (a+2s)/3s, an increase in 
output to the tune of  (a+2s)/3s2. This would in turn lead to increase in the demand for 
bonds by v(a+2s)/3s2 and a down ward pressure on the bond rate of interest. Stability 
requires that the additional demand for bonds should not over compensate excess supply of 
bonds, so that there would be a net increase in the bond rate of interest enabling it to return 
to its original position. In other words, 
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Then the stability condition requires that the PM locus must be steeper than the BM locus, or, in 
other words,   
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Figure 1.
